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Recent economic commentary has been filled with “D” words: deficits, debt,
deflation, depreciation. Deficits—budget and trade—are of the greatest concern
and may be on an unsustainable course, as federal and national debt grow with-
out limit. The United States is already the world’s largest debtor nation, and
unconstrained trade deficits are said to raise the specter of a “tequila crisis”if for-
eigners run from the dollar. Federal budget red ink is expected to imperil the
nation’s ability to care for tomorrow’s retirees. While public concern with defla-
tionary pressures has subsided, concern continues regarding America’s ability to
compete in a global economy in which wages and prices are falling. In fact, the
current situation is far more “sustainable” than that at the peak of the Clinton
boom, which had federal budget surpluses but record-breaking private sector
deficits. Nevertheless, it is time to take stock of the dangers faced by the U.S.
economy.
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The first danger examined is the “triple threat”of U.S. deficits:
private sector,federal budget,and trade deficits.Since 1996,the
private sector as a whole (including both households and firms)
has been spending more than its income. At the peak of the
Clinton economic expansion, private deficits amounted to
almost 6 percent of GDP, easily a record. Deficits this large
meant that private sector debt was growing much faster than
private sector income—a topic for the next section.In any case,
as various analyses by Levy Institute scholars warned at the
time, an expansion driven by private deficits was unsustain-
able. As the private sector began to retrench and bring spend-
ing into line with income, the economy fell into recession.
Quick response by the Federal Reserve, together with well-
timed tax cuts and increased spending for security and defense,
turned things around. Nearly historically low interest rates
encouraged households to borrow against home equity, which
fueled consumption and a housing boom and kept private sec-
tor spending above income.
While private sector deficits today are much smaller than
they were in 2000, we are still in a very unusual situation as a
result of continuous deficit spending for the past eight years. It
would be an understatement to say that nothing like this has
ever happened before. The historical average for private sector
balances is a surplus of 2 to 3 percent of GDP and economic
downturns typically cause a retrenchment that generates a sur-
plus two or three times higher than average.A simple return to
the historical average would open up an aggregate demand gap
of $300 to $400 billion.If this occurred,it is very difficult to see
how a deep recession with double-digit unemployment could
be avoided. Monetary policy cannot provide much thrust
because the Fed’s target rate is already 1 percent,mortgage rates
are near historical lows,and most households have already refi-
nanced to lower mortgage payments and cash out equity.
This brings us to the federal budget deficit, which has
reversed course sharply since 2000 by moving from a three-
year surplus that peaked at 2.5 percent of GDP to a deficit
approaching 5 percent of GDP. Ten-year projections of the
budget balance have moved from an accumulated surplus of
$5.6 trillion when George W. Bush came to office to accumu-
lated deficits as high as $5 trillion. In recent testimony, Fed
chairman Alan Greenspan projected red ink much farther than
the eye can see,warning that the present value of future budget
deficits is now $44 trillion,due mostly to “unfunded”mandates
in the Social Security and Medicare programs. While many
analysts, including Greenspan, recognize the important role
played by budget deficits in propping up an ailing economy,
they warn that we now need to undertake some combination of
spending cuts and a rollback of Bush tax cuts to put the federal
budget back into a sustainable position.
Finally, the chronic and growing trade deficit has raised
two concerns. The first concern is among policymakers who
blame the trade deficit for the loss of jobs, especially in manu-
facturing. The current recovery is “jobless,” with a net loss of
approximately 2.9 million private sector jobs (which is partially
offset by an increase of 700,000 public sector jobs), and some
analysts argue that many of these job losses are permanent,due
to competition from low-wage countries. The second concern
is that the trade deficit requires financing by foreigners, which
increases the U.S.external debt and the interest and profit flows
going abroad. This deficit then raises the possibility of a flight
out of the dollar and a collapse of the exchange rate.
Debt
Each deficit flow leads to an associated accumulation of debt.
For example, the projection of federal budget deficits of $400
to $500 billion per year for the next 10 years means that the
outstanding stock of federal government debt will rise by up to
$5 trillion. Historically, the federal government has been free
from debt only once—in 1837—and private sector debt has
grown almost every year. In terms of external debt, the United
States was a “debtor nation” in the 19th century, but became a
net creditor after World War II. Since the Reagan presidency,
however, the United States has become the nation with the
largest external debt in the world.
Most analysts recognize that debt, by itself, is not neces-
sarily a bad thing. Knowing that a household or firm owes
$100,000 really does not tell us much. Two ratios are impor-
tant, however: the portion of income flows required to service
outstanding debt and the ratio of debt-to-income flows.
Unfortunately,there is no purely objective way to gauge whether
either ratio is excessive. An economic unit could conceivably
devote 99 percent of income flows to debt service,although this
would leave little income for other purposes and would be
highly risky (a slight reduction of income or a small increase of
financing costs would cause immediate insolvency). Hence,
conventions and rules of thumb establish prudent debt-service
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to rise to just above 14 percent during economic expansions
before households retrench, borrow less, and retire some debt.
Prudent debt-to-income ratios are just as hard to establish,and
the private sector’s debt-to-income ratio has trended upward
since World War II. In expansions, the ratio rises more quickly,
while in recessions, the rising trend of the ratio slows or halts
temporarily. Economists have often argued that a steadily ris-
ing debt-to-income ratio is unsustainable, and, indeed, almost
any trend ultimately appears unsustainable if carried to logical
extremes.
Debt ratios for the federal government are generally calcu-
lated somewhat differently. Because government “income” is
somewhat discretionary (the government can raise tax rates)
and the government is said to have the option of printing
money to finance its spending,government debt ratios are typ-
ically measured relative to GDP rather than relative to govern-
ment income. Hence, the relevant ratios are government
interest payments or sovereign debt relative to GDP. Again,
there is no consensus regarding the proper ratios—some
European government interest payments have reached 10 per-
cent of GDP, and Turkey flirts with interest payments nearly
three times that level. Government debt-to-GDP ratios have
reached 60 percent in the United States and well above 100 per-
cent in some European nations. Again, economists tend to
proffer a sustainability constraint,i.e.,the government debt-to-
GDP ratio should not exhibit a rising trend, although this is at
least as arbitrary as the imposition of a constraint on the pri-
vate sector.
Finally, things become no clearer when it comes to exter-
nal debt. Analysts frequently lump all external debt together,
although two distinctions should be made: (1) there is a differ-
ence between public sector and private sector debt; and (2) it
matters whether the external debt is denominated in the
domestic currency.From the perspective of the individual con-
sumer or firm, it matters little whether the domestic cur-
rency–denominated debt is held by domestic or foreign
creditors, and all that I said earlier concerning private sector
debt applies to the case where debt is held by foreigners.
When foreigners hold domestic currency–denominated
government debt, government interest payments go to foreign
creditors. Again, which debt ratios are appropriate is not clear.
Some governments issue debt denominated in a foreign cur-
rency, typically the dollar, and this is more problematic than
domestic currency–denominated debt. In this case, neither tax
revenues nor GDP are the appropriate denominators for the
debt or debt-service ratios because GDP and taxes are mostly
realized in the form of domestic currency.Rather,the source of
foreign currency used to service such debt is a trade surplus,or
borrowing on the capital account. If either source dries up, the
ability to service such debt is called into question.While this is
a concern for many nations, it does not apply to the United
States because all federal government debt and almost all pri-
vate sector debt are denominated in dollars.
Deflation
Having recently examined deflation in detail (Wray 2003;Wray
and Papadimitriou 2003), I will not devote much space to this
issue.It is sufficient to note that deflationary pressures at home
and abroad are real and that falling prices and wages can
quickly generate rising debt burdens, because almost all debt
payment commitments are fixed in nominal terms. While I do
not believe that the likelihood of a 1930s-style debt deflation
process is high, the costs would be so great that policymakers
should remain on guard. In any case, even if most prices
remain steady, domestic and global demand will likely remain
depressed with high unemployment and excess capacity in
most economies and across many sectors. While a few com-
mentators fret about the dangers of inflation, I do not believe
that their fears should be taken seriously.
Depreciation
In 2003 there was much talk about the possibility of continued
and, perhaps, uncontrolled depreciation of the dollar. This was
linked to concerns about the U.S. trade deficit. In fact, what
actually occurred was mostly a recovery of the euro, which had
depreciated sharply relative to the dollar after monetary union.
To a lesser extent, the dollar was adjusting after a period of
overvaluation probably linked to the New Economy boom and
very high demand for U.S. equities. In recent months, the dol-
lar’s slide relative to the euro has halted, and much of the fear
of depreciation seems to have subsided.Still,there are fears that
the unsustainable growth of trade deficits that must be
financed by increased “borrowing from abroad” by the U.S.
government will continue to exert downward pressure on the
dollar. The worst-case scenario is a run out of dollar assets,
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would subject the world’s largest economy to a bailout by inter-
national lenders.
An Alternative View
Scholars at the Levy Institute have taken advantage of the pio-
neering sectoral analyses of Hyman Minsky and Wynne Godley
to understand the relationships among the financial balances
of the government, private, and foreign sectors. The private
sector balance equals the sum of the government and current
account balances.
At the peak of the Clinton boom, the overall government
budget was in surplus (about 1.5 percent of GDP). This sur-
plus, added to the current account deficit (about 4 percent of
GDP), generated a total private sector deficit of about 5.5 per-
cent of GDP. For the reasons discussed above, I argued at the
time that a private sector deficit of this magnitude would not
be sustained. As private sector spending slowed, tax revenues
fell relative to government spending and generated a reversal of
the government’s budget. In addition, the collapse of equity
markets eliminated taxable capital gains and executive
bonuses, eroding government revenues further. On top of this,
the Bush tax cuts and spending increases by the federal gov-
ernment led to a large and growing budget deficit, which
allowed the private sector to move closer to a balanced budget.
However, the growing trade deficit partially offset the benefits
of the federal budget deficit, as did spending cuts by local and
state governments (whose revenues also fell as the economy
slowed and capital gains taxes fell rapidly).
All of these trends could have been and, indeed, were pre-
dicted. The current relationships among the three sectoral bal-
ances are more sustainable than they were in 2000.The truth is
that the federal budget’s constraint is far “softer”than the con-
straints faced by the private sector—a point on which virtually
all analysts agree. Our government’s current deficit-to-GDP
ratio is not high compared with past ratios or those achieved in
other nations. The government debt-to-GDP ratio is relatively
low compared to U.S.postwar experience and with ratios com-
monly achieved in other nations. Indeed, few commentators
are concerned with the current ratios; rather, the focus is on
projections of what might happen over the next decade, or five
to ten decades in the future.
Not only are these projections likely to be incorrect, but
more important, I believe they are wrongheaded. The future
size of the U.S. federal budget deficit (or an increase of the
debt), whether or not measured as a ratio of GDP, does not
provide useful information by itself. Over any given period,
such as a year,there is a “proper”fiscal stance,but this does not
depend on any preconceived notion of the sustainable deficit
or debt. Rather, the appropriate fiscal stance depends on the
private sector’s desired level of spending, given its income and
the external balance. Assuming that the U.S. trade deficit con-
tinues at 4 or 5 percent of GDP and the private sector wishes to
balance spending and income, it will be necessary for the over-
all government balance to be in deficit at 4 or 5 percent of GDP.
Because state governments really do face “hard” budget con-
straints, it is up to the federal government to run the deficits.
What happens if the federal government hesitates to relax
its budget, based on some out-of-paradigm belief about fiscal
responsibility? Then a demand gap opens up, as the private 
sector finds that its income is less than expected, and sales,
employment, and tax revenues fall. A government budget
deficit is created, but at a lower overall level of activity and
higher unemployment. My argument is that the government
budget balance is, to a large extent, nondiscretionary. During
the Clinton boom, the high propensity to spend in the private
sector, taken together with “fiscally responsible” budgeting
adopted after the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act (1985), cre-
ated large federal budget surpluses.In the last half of the 1990s,
this might have been close to the proper fiscal stance,as private
spending was sufficiently robust to move the economy closer 
to full employment than it had been in a quarter century.
Ultimately, the best indicator of the necessary budget adjust-
ment is involuntary unemployment: if there are people with-
out jobs who want to work (or workers with part-time jobs
who want to work more hours), then the fiscal stance is too
restrictive.By this measure,the Clinton surplus was less restric-
tive at the peak of the economic boom than is Bush’s current
deficit at 5 percent of GDP.
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All Fiscal Programs Are Not Created Equal
My argument should not be interpreted as a call for simple
pump priming—not all demand stimulus is the same—since
tax cuts have different impacts on employment and the econ-
omy than do spending enhancements. Furthermore, the types
of tax cuts and spending programs also matter. The Bush tax
cuts have been largely targeted to upper-income households
and nonwage income. The employment-multiplier effects of
such tax cuts, as expected, have been fairly small. This does not
necessarily mean that these tax cuts were bad policy, although
some of the capital gains tax cuts probably fueled asset sales (to
take advantage of lower rates) and depressed equity prices.
Moreover,inheritance tax cuts might have undesirable impacts
on the concentration of wealth over generations.Still,whatever
the wisdom of the Bush tax cuts, future relief ought to be tar-
geted toward lower-income families. For this reason, I support
a reduction of the payroll tax, which would likely have large
multiplier effects on employment in terms of the demand side
(stimulating consumption) and the supply side (increasing
incentives of employers to hire and workers to work).
Not all government spending is equal with regard to
employment creation, either. Foreign wars probably do not
create as many jobs as an equivalent level of spending on
domestic infrastructure or education. Direct job creation by
government, such as New Deal-type public service employ-
ment (PSE) programs, has been demonstrated to create more
jobs for the buck than alternative government programs.
Public subsidies for private employment have been far less
effective,for obvious reasons—they tend to lead to substitution
rather than net job creation. Worker training programs
enhance the desirability of certain workers but tend to redis-
tribute jobs rather than create new ones. Direct and indirect
support for high-tech and R&D programs creates high-paying
jobs for the highly educated (which can cause some “trickle-
down”job creation), but these workers are rarely jobless. Thus,
a renewed “Star Wars” program would likely need a much
greater amount of federal government spending to create the
same number of jobs than a much smaller direct-employment
program. Finally, government spending and tax policies can be
distortionary, which is something to consider when formulat-
ing fiscal stimulus programs. Targeted tax breaks or employ-
ment subsidies,as well as specific government projects like Star
Wars, will direct resources into favored activities, with job cre-
ation mostly an afterthought.
Quelling the Fear of Inflation
This leads me to one of the greatest fears about demand stim-
ulus and government deficits—inflation. Our late colleague,
Hyman Minsky,always worried about the inflation potential of
social spending programs—“welfare,”unemployment benefits,
or Social Security—that add to demand without directly creat-
ing jobs. Indeed, Minsky complained that these programs
effectively pay people not to work. By contrast, direct job cre-
ation that puts people to work doing useful things can add to
national output and raise living standards without generating
much inflationary pressure. A stimulus package that promotes
“hiring off the top” (e.g., a government program that creates
demand for highly skilled engineers) will generate wage infla-
tion,at least for highly trained workers,long before jobs trickle
down to those with the least education and training. A jobs
program that “hires off the bottom” and pays the minimum
wage to all who are ready and willing to work will create hun-
dreds of thousands, perhaps even millions of jobs, without
generating significant inflationary pressures.
I say this recognizing that the problem today is deflation-
ary, not inflationary, pressures. If policy becomes focused on
maintaining a fiscal stance consistent with full employment,
however, then inflation fears will eventually arise. I believe that
inflationary pressures can be held in check. First, competitive
pressures in our open economy will hold down wage and 
price pressures for products that can be produced abroad.
Maintaining relative stability of wages paid in PSE programs
will provide a wage floor without pushing up market wages.
Indeed,to the extent that PSE workers can be hired away by the
private sector,they will operate as a “buffer stock,”because pri-
vate employers can recruit them at a markup over the program
wage. Further, as discussed above, high employment can be
maintained with lower levels of government spending and,
indeed, lower aggregate demand.
Finally,as Minsky always argued,a direct job-creation pro-
gram can provide full employment even in a low-growth econ-
omy.The prevailing wisdom is that high growth is necessary so
that a “rising tide”can “lift all boats.”History shows that, while
it is true that the boats at the bottom do somewhat better when
the economy grows rapidly, the effect has been vastly over-
stated. Forty years after the beginning of the War on Poverty
(with its heavy emphasis on rising tides and training and edu-
cation for the poor), there has been relatively little progress in
reducing poverty. Further, Minsky argued that a high-growth6 Policy Note, 2004 / 2
strategy favors private investment and generates growing
financial fragility and instability. The evidence of the past 40
years confirms Minsky’s fear that financial crises would
become increasingly common and severe as a result of high-
growth strategies. A lower-growth, high-consumption, full-
employment strategy that could result from direct job creation
would entail potentially lower inflation. Minsky also argued
that if inflation reared its ugly head in such a regime, appro-
priate policy should constrain wage increases at the upper end
of the pay scale rather than raise the unemployment level of
low-skilled workers.
External Constraints
We are left with concerns about the trade deficit.From sectoral
analysis, we know that if the trade deficit closes, the overall fis-
cal stance could be tighter and, if the trade deficit grows, the
fiscal stance would need to be relaxed for a given private sector
balance. As discussed above, one of the fears associated with
trade deficits is the loss of jobs. Once the fear of government
deficits is removed, policy can tackle unemployment problems
created by imports. The best policy response to a trade deficit
is to create jobs,not to block imports.In some cases,retraining
might be necessary,together with temporary income replacement
for people losing jobs to foreign competition.However,it must
be emphasized that, from the vantage point of the U.S. econ-
omy as a whole,imports are a benefit while exports are a cost—
net imports mean we get to consume more than we produce.
There is a great deal of confusion over the relationship
between trade deficits and international “flows” of currency,
reserves, and finance. For example, it is often claimed that the
United States needs foreign savings in order to finance its per-
sistent trade deficit, which results from “profligate U.S. con-
sumers living beyond their means.”Such a statement makes no
sense for a sovereign nation operating on a flexible exchange
rate.When viewed from the vantage point of the economy as a
whole, a U.S. trade deficit results when the rest of the world
(ROW) wishes to accumulate dollar assets. The ROW exports
to the United States reflect the “cost”imposed on citizens of the
ROW as they obtain the “benefit” of accumulating dollar-
denominated assets. From the perspective of the United States
as a whole,the net benefit of the trade deficit is the net imports
that Americans enjoy.In contrast to the conventional view,it is
more revealing to think that the U.S. trade deficit finances the
net dollar savings of the ROW rather than to think that the
ROW finances the U.S. trade deficit. If and when the ROW
decides that it has a sufficient stock of dollar assets, then the
U.S. trade deficit will disappear.
There are two reasons that a tequila crisis is exceedingly
unlikely: (1) the United States operates a floating exchange rate
regime,so speculative pressures cannot build in anticipation of
a policy change to devalue its currency;and (2) many countries
peg their currencies against the dollar (or go even further with
currency boards), so it is unlikely that these countries will sud-
denly decide to run down their dollar reserves. In addition,
many governments and firms outside the United States have
dollar-denominated liabilities and an almost insatiable
demand to obtain dollars to service their debts. Furthermore,
managed money all over the world attempts to maintain a sub-
stantial portfolio position in dollar assets. None of this means
that an orderly depreciation of the dollar is impossible, but it
does diminish the probability of a run on the dollar.
Further Policy Recommendations
In addition to the policies discussed above, I advocate a sub-
stantial increase in federal funding for state and local govern-
ments—$150 billion per year, perhaps—with a countercyclical
component. Unlike state and local governments (as well as
households and firms), the federal government can spend
countercyclically without regard to its revenues. The federal
government spends by crediting bank accounts and taxes by
debiting them. Hence, it does not and cannot use tax revenues
to finance its spending. Free of financial constraints that are
faced by other levels of government, the federal government
can concern itself with the economy’s real problems: unem-
ployment, hunger, poverty, homelessness, fiscal crises at the
state and local government levels, decaying public infrastruc-
ture, inadequate health care for the uninsured, and low-quality
education in many urban school districts.
The fear-mongering by zealots who point to looming
financial crises supposedly occasioned by “$44 trillion of
unfunded baby-boomer retirements” should be dismissed out
of hand. Rather, policymakers ought to reassure senior citizens
that their promises can and will be kept.If we have learned any-
thing from Japan’s decade-long malaise,
1 it should be that,once
the population loses faith that its government will provide for
its future, private savings can never be high enough. Even withsubstantial trade surpluses and budget deficits reaching 8 per-
cent of GDP, households and firms in Japan struggle to run
larger budget surpluses,which is a rational response to a climate
of uncertainty and fear about the future.I puzzle over the attempts
by some policymakers to create a similar environment here.
Note
1. Japan finally appears poised for recovery, as more than a
decade of budget deficits seems to have overcome the
headwinds of fear and uncertainty by filling private port-
folios with safe government bonds.
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